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ABSTRACT 
In a recent critique of situational crime prevention (Wortley, 1997) it was argued that there 
are two distinct kinds of situational forces acting on behavior -- those which are responsible 
for precipitating action and those which regulate behavior by the opportunities they present. 
The present paper proposes a two-stage prevention model for conceptualising precipitating 
and regulating situational forces. There are two major implications of the model. First, it is 
suggested that by intervening at the precipitation stage some criminal behaviour can be 
averted prior to the offender experiencing any inclination to offend. This has particular 
implications for explaining why crime displacement often does not occur. Second, the model 
proposes a ‘feed-back loop’ by which, in some circumstances, excessive constraint can 
transform into a situational precipitator. This aspect of the model can be used to help explain 
counterproductive effects of some opportunity-reduction strategies. In the light of the model, 
the issue of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ situational crime prevention is discussed. 
 
Key words: situational crime prevention, crime prevention, opportunity-reduction, 
opportunity, displacement.  
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In his second edition to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Jeffery (1977) 
bemoaned the direction which the practice of situational crime prevention had taken since the 
first edition of his book in 1971. As Jeffery noted, initial approaches to situational crime 
prevention relied on the subtle interplay between person and environment. However, he 
complained, as situational prevention developed, crude target-hardening approaches came to 
dominate. The use of territorial boundaries in crime prevention is an example of this change. 
In the early crime prevention literature, the emphasis was on the deterrent effects of symbolic 
territorial markers which exerted an influence over potential offenders of which they may not 
have been fully aware. However, subsequently, territorial boundaries were more likely to 
involve real fences and bars which are used to physically prevent potential offenders carrying 
out their intended courses of action.  
 
Since Jeffery’s observations of over twenty years ago, critics of situational prevention have 
continued to focus on the target hardening aspects of the model. Quite apart from the social 
and ethical objections which are invariably raised, there are two major theoretical limitations 
of crime prevention which relies largely on physically blocking criminal opportunities. First, 
such a model provides a weak theoretical defence to the common criticism that situational 
methods may displace, but will not prevent, criminal behavior. According to the opportunity-
reduction thesis, when potential offenders are thwarted in one location, the effort of moving 
on to a new crime location is often sufficient deterrent to further criminal behaviour. This 
argument is based on the crucial role accorded the person-situation interaction in the 
performance of criminal behavior. However, reducing the crime prevention task to that of 
physically repelling the motivated perpetrator ironically perpetuates a view of offenders as 
internally driven, a view which is not much different from that to be found in the familiar 
dispositional theories of crime. From this perspective, having an initial crime avenue blocked 
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seems a rather trivial setback for criminally motivated individuals and unlikely to dissuade 
them from simply trying their luck elsewhere.  
 
The second theoretical difficulty with a narrow opportunity-reduction model of crime 
prevention is its inability to adequately account for interventions which produce opposite 
outcomes to those intended. It is often asserted that situational measures which physically 
restrict or constrain potential offenders may be counterproductive and produce the very 
conditions which support criminal behavior (e.g., Bottoms et al, 1995; Weiss, 1987). 
Grabosky (1996) details a number of specific ways that situational prevention can backfire. 
He notes, for example, that threats of punishment may incite defiance, and that blocking 
criminal opportunities may provoke frustration and expressive violence. Rather than having 
the desired deterrent effects on potential law-breakers, these measures may actually escalate 
crime. In explaining these counterproductive effects, Grabosky argues against narrowly 
defining offenders as ‘utility maximizers’ and calls for a better understanding of ‘basic causal 
processes’. However, he stops short of suggesting how these apparently anomalous outcomes 
might be explained and predicted by a more general situational framework.  
 
That opportunity reduction need not necessarily entail obtrusive physical interventions has 
been reinforced in ongoing theoretical developments in the area (Clarke, 1997; Felson, 1994). 
Nevertheless, as Wortley (1997) has argued, even opportunity reduction broadly defined 
continues to present a limited picture of the role of situations in crime. The present paper 
describes a two-stage situational prevention model which attempts to give fuller recognition 
to the complexity of the person-environment relationship, and, in doing so, to also address the 
theoretical problems of crime displacement and counterproductive prevention described 
above. The model has been developed from arguments outlined in Wortley (1997) proposing 
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that a distinction be made between situations which have a precipitating function for behavior 
and situations which regulate behavior through the opportunity characteristics they posses. 
According to these arguments, there are a variety of psychological processes by which 
individuals may be actively induced to engage in criminal conduct which they may not have 
otherwise undertaken. Once behavior has been precipitated, performance of the behavior is 
then subject to consideration of the consequences which are likely to follow. To date, little 
explicit recognition has been given in situational crime prevention to the role of crime-
precipitators. It is the latter stage of the offending process -- the cost-benefit analysis -- which 
has been the traditional focus and which has provided the rationale for opportunity-reduction 
strategies aimed at blocking offenders’ criminal behavior.1 
 
The proposed relationship between precipitating situations and regulating situations is shown 
in Figure 1. The model extends the traditional opportunity-reduction model in two ways. 
First, the model suggests that some criminal behavior may be entirely avoided by intervention 
at the crime-precipitation stage without the need in these cases for opportunity-reducing 
strategies. Second, the model includes a feedback-loop whereby the excessive use of 
constraint is seen to increase precipitating pressures on behaviour. These two aspects of the 
model and their implications for crime prevention are elaborated upon in the following 
sections. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
PRECIPITATING FACTORS 
                                                            
1 Wortley (1997) used the term ‘readying’ to describe the role of situational inducements to offend. However, as 
Newman (1997) pointed out, this term has already been used in the situational prevention literature to describe a 
number of distinct phenomena. The alternative term ‘precipitating’ is used in this article. Precipitating conveys 
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Figure 1 shows four ways in which situations can precipitate crime: situations can present 
cues which prompt the individual to perform criminal behavior, they can exert social pressure 
on an individual to offend, they can induce disinhibition and permit potential offenders to 
commit normally proscribed illegal acts, and they can produce emotional arousal which 
provokes a criminal response (Wortley 1997). 
 
SITUATIONS THAT PROMPT 
Situations may present salient cues to potential offenders which prompt criminal reactions. 
The concept of prompting is based on learning theory’s stimulus-response (S-R) principle 
which holds that virtually all action must be initiated by an appropriate cue in the immediate 
environment. Even if a criminal pattern of behavior has been learned and internalised by an 
individual, situational conditions govern if and when this behavior is emitted. In every-day 
terminology, environmental cues may be said to tempt us, jog our memory, evoke moods, set 
examples to follow, create expectations, stimulate us and alert us to impending consequences. 
 
Some environmental cues elicit automatic or reflex responses. There are many everyday 
examples where particular situations become associated with predictable physiological or 
behavioural reactions -- viewing erotic images produces sexual arousal, the sight of blood 
makes many people feel nauseous, the smell of food makes people feel hungry, and so forth. 
Thus, even an habitual pedophile may require external prompts -- the sight of children, 
pornographic images and so forth -- in order to become sexually aroused and ready to offend. 
Keeping pedophiles away from children not only limits their physical opportunity to offend 
but helps them keep their sexual desires in check. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the concept of urging on behavior, but does not have quite the deterministic connotations of other terms such as 
‘triggering’ or ‘instigating’.  
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Cues may also signal the likely consequence of a particular behaviour. Depending upon the 
nature of the likely outcome, behaviour will be pursued or avoided. For example, a green 
traffic light signals to drivers that they may proceed safely through an intersection; observing 
a police officer in the rear-view mirror signals that the drivers will nevertheless need to take 
care not to speed when doing so. Based on this principle, prompts may be introduced into an 
environment to indicate that certain behaviours are now appropriate. Signs clarify expected 
standards of behavior and may specify the consequences of non-compliance, strategically 
placed litter bins prompt people not to litter, symbolic territorial boundary markers (low 
fences, shrubs, personal items etc.) signal to people not trespass, and so on. 
 
Other cues prompt imitation. Children who observe other children engaging in aggressive 
play are likely themselves to also play aggressively, particularly if the model is seen to 
receive a reward (Bandura, 1965). Lefkowitz et al (1955) demonstrated that a pedestrian 
crossing the street against a red light will readily prompt others to follow. Controlling 
imitation effects by increasing exposure to prosocial models or reducing the exposure to 
undesirable models is a popular method of attempting to influence behaviour. Parents screen 
their children’s associates in a common-sense attempt to manage imitation influences. Public 
education campaigns (litter reduction, anti-smoking, seat-belt wearing and the like) enlist the 
aid of sporting personalities and the like in the hope that the public will be induced to imitate 
the example the celebrities set. The elimination of undesirable imitation influences is the 
rationale for restricting or censoring media portrayals of pornography and violence (Lab, 
1992). 
 
SITUATIONS THAT EXERT PRESSURE 
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Situations may exert social pressure on individuals to perform illegal behavior. A 
fundamental premise of social psychology is that people behave differently in the company of 
others than when alone. Human beings are social animals and are strongly influenced by the 
expectations of those around them. Individuals are subject to pressures to conform to group 
norms and to comply with the demands of authority figures. History is replete with examples 
of crimes and acts of brutality carried out by individuals simply going along with the crowd 
or obediently following the commands of superiors.  
 
Corruption within organisations is a good example of the power of conformity to induce 
illegal behavior. A new employee entering an organization in which corrupt practices are 
common faces social pressures to also engage in those practices (Clark & Hollinger, 1984). 
Initially, individuals may accede to group pressure in order to avoid disapproval and to gain 
acceptance. However, individuals also look to the group for guidelines for correct behavior 
and may come to accept corrupt practices as normal. Social support for the corrupt activity 
may be expressed in group norms such as ‘everybody does it’ and ‘it goes with the job’. 
 
The most commonly cited real-world example of the potency of obedience effects is the 
routine, brutal treatment of Jews by Nazi soldiers and concentration camps guards in World 
War II. Milgram (1974) suggested that many societies overvalue obedience and provide 
insufficient models for the appropriate defiance of orders. Individuals obey unreasonable 
commands because of a preoccupation with the administrative rather than moral component 
of their job and through a sense of loyalty and duty to their organisation. When brutal orders 
are carried out, Milgram argued, ‘typically we do not find a heroic figure struggling with 
conscience, nor a pathologically aggressive man ruthlessly exploiting a position of power, but 
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a functionary who has been given a job to do and who strives to create an impression of 
competence in his work’ (1974, p. 187). 
 
SITUATIONS THAT PERMIT 
Situations may induce disinhibition and permit individuals to engage in normally proscribed 
behaviours. While disinhibition is usually associated with drug-induced states, there are a 
number of ways that environmental factors can interfere with individuals’ ability to keep a 
check on their behavior. Situations in which potential offenders are made to feel anonymous, 
are able to submerge their identities in a crowd, are able to diffuse responsibility for their 
behavior, or are encouraged to portray potential victims in a dehumanised fashion all interfere 
with self-censuring and self-control mechanisms. 
 
Zimbardo (1970) examined the role of anonymity in criminal behavior. He abandoned a car 
in New York and another in Palo Alto (population about 55,000). He found that the car in 
New York was quickly stripped by looters of all valuable parts while the car in Palo Alto was 
left untouched. Zimbardo argued that the behaviour of New Yorkers could be explained by 
the anonymity they felt living in a large city and the sense of licence such anonymity 
provided. 
 
A similar disinhibiting social process is deindividuation. Deindividuation refers to the sense 
of depersonalisation typically experienced by individuals when they become immersed in a 
group. Under the state of deindividuation, individuals have reduced capacity to exercise 
normal self-control over their behaviour and become more susceptible to situational 
pressures. Deindividuated behavior is characterised its unrestrained and indiscriminate 
nature, and observers may be struck by the joyous, carnival-like atmosphere as the crowd 
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rampages (Zimbardo, 1970). In its extreme form, deindividuation is exemplified by the herd 
mentality and frenzied behaviour displayed by members of a ‘lynch-mob’ (Colman, 1991). 
 
Depersonalisation of potential victims in the eyes of the offender is also disinhibiting. It is 
easier to victimize those who can be stereotyped as sub-human or unworthy, or even those 
who are simply outsiders or anonymous (Bandura 1976, 1977; Bandura et al, 1996). 
Appearance, dress and mannerisms may facilitate the process of depersonalization and 
increase chances of victimisation. For example, Zimbardo et al (1982) showed that the 
wearing of uniforms and badges of outgroup membership by victims encouraged their 
stereotyping by aggressors. Dehumanisation may be further facilitated by the physical 
environments in which potential victims are located. The finding that victimisation rates are 
high in large housing estates and run-down ghettos (Newman, 1973) may be partly explained 
by the ease with which inhabitants of these environments are rendered anonymous and 
devoid of personal qualities.  
 
SITUATIONS THAT PROVOKE 
Situations may provoke emotional arousal which can trigger an antisocial response. Aversive 
emotional arousal can be generated by frustrating and stressful situations. Organisms attempt 
to manage or adapt to these aversive conditions with a fight or flight response. Reactions may 
be physiological (e.g., arousal, increased adrenaline activity, physical illness), emotional 
(e.g., irritability, anxiety, depression) and behavioural (e.g., aggression, withdrawal, suicide). 
 
Frustration is the emotional state produced when an individual is thwarted in their pursuit of 
goal-directed behaviour. Originally it was argued that frustration was the direct and inevitable 
cause of aggression (Dollard et al, 1939). According to Dollard et al, when an animal -- 
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including the human animal -- is prevented from performing behaviour which has previously 
delivered rewards, the animal automatically experiences an increased level of physiological 
arousal. The animal is then driven to reduce the unpleasant effects of this arousal and does so 
by responding with some form of aggressive behaviour (snarling, scratching, biting etc.). 
More recently it has been realized that frustration does not always produce aggression and 
nor is aggression always caused by frustration. Some people respond to frustration by 
productively striving to overcome the frustrating situation, while others simply become 
resigned to defeat. Similarly, Bandura (1977) pointed out that frustration is just one of a 
number of events which people experience as aversive. Verbal threats and insults, physical 
assaults, painful treatment, failure experiences, and delay or deprivation of rewards can all 
increase emotional arousal and provoke aggressive responses.  
 
According to the environmental stress model, many factors in the environment -- geographic 
and climactic variables such as temperature, sunshine, wind and humidity, and the products 
of urbanisation including high-density living, workplace noise, lighting and interior design -- 
influence behaviour because of their aversive nature and the threat they pose to human well-
being (Baum et al, 1981; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Veitch & Arkelin, 1995). Taken 
individually, these environmental stressors may represent little more than background 
irritation. However, collectively and accumulatively, ambient noxious stimulation may 
seriously affect psychological functioning. For example, a number of studies have reported a 
correlation between temperature and violent crime (Anderson, 1987; Cotton, 1986; Harries & 
Stadler, 1988). Banzinger and Owens (1978) found a correlation between wind speed and 
delinquency. Other studies have found correlations between urban population density and 
crime rates (Galle et al, 1972; Gove et al, 1977), as well as a relationship between crowding 
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and behavioral problems in specific settings such as prisons (Cox et al, 1984; Paulus, 1988), 
night-clubs (Macintyre & Homel, 1997) and naval ships (Dean et al, 1978) 
 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE CONSTRAINT 
In the event that behavior is precipitated, performance of that behavior is regulated by 
consideration of the consequences which are likely to follow. Regulators may take the form 
of rewards and punishments, or environmental conditions which place more direct physical 
constraints on behavior. Regulating behavior is the usual focus of situational crime 
prevention and the logic of this approach is comprehensively described by rational choice 
perspective and the opportunity-reduction model of situational prevention (Clarke, 1992, 
1997). To the traditional opportunity-reduction model, the model shown in Figure 1 adds the 
proposal that there are critical bands within which regulating factors operate. The absence of 
appropriate disincentives or constraints will permit or encourage behavior; appropriate 
disincentives or constraints will prevent or discourage behavior. However, the model includes 
a feedback-loop whereby the excessive use of constraint is seen to be counterproductive and 
increase precipitating pressures on behaviour. If prevention methods aimed at reducing 
opportunity are too heavy-handed, then, rather than preventing crime, they may encourage 
criminal acts. As detailed below, excessive constraint can transform into each of the four 
categories of precipitation described earlier.  
 
EXCESSIVE CONSTRAINT AND SITUATIONAL PROMPTS 
Some methods of constraining potential offenders can inadvertently present cues which 
prompt criminal behavior. According to the principle of classical conditioning, a neutral 
stimulus can take on the response-evoking properties of an eliciting stimulus if the two 
stimuli have been previously paired. It is by this process that Pavlov’s dogs came to salivate 
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at the sound of a bell (neutral stimulus) which earlier had been rung in the presence of food 
(eliciting stimulus). Applying this principle to crime prevention, if an object used to help 
control behavior has associations with situations which have elicited antisocial responses in 
the past, then the object may itself elicit an antisocial response.  
 
An example of unintentional cueing is the so-called weapons effect (Berkowitz, 1983; 
Berkowitz & Page, 1967). It has been found that the mere presence in the immediate 
environment of a firearm increases the probability of aggression. Berkowitz hypothesised 
that, through their repeated association with violence, firearms become eliciting stimuli 
which conjure aggressive images and moods and facilitate overt aggression. There may be 
times, then, where the overt wearing of firearms and other militaristic paraphernalia by 
police, prison guards and security officers may actually provoke the very responses that these 
objects are intended to deter.  
 
A related phenomenon, also based on classical conditioning, is the expectancy effect. 
Expectancy refers to the tendency for individuals to respond on the basis of preconceived 
beliefs about a situation. These beliefs may be elicited or at least confirmed by relevant cues 
within the situation. For example, Graham and Homel (1996) argued that levels of night-club 
violence were related to the reputations which the night-clubs had acquired, and that these 
reputations were in turn partly determined by physical characteristics of the premises. Patrons 
visited certain night-clubs anticipating that they would be involved in violent incidents, and 
this expectation acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Gentrifying the decor of violent night-
clubs signals that non-violent behavior is now expected from patrons. On the other hand, 
responding with an over-reliance on ugly, vandal-proof fittings may only exacerbate the 
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problem by confirming the self-fulfilling message that violent and destructive behavior is 
expected. 
 
EXCESSIVE CONSTRAINT AND SOCIAL PRESSURE  
The use of coercive force against members of a group can provoke collective defiance. 
Groups typically have two responses to perceived external threats and conflicts. First, there is 
an increase in intra-group cohesion and greater pressure on individual members to conform to 
group norms (Dion, 1979; Forsyth, 1990). Second, in-group/out-group differentiations 
become more sharply drawn. Members of a cohesive group develop a strong sense of in-
group righteousness and a corresponding belief in the moral illegitimacy of the threatening 
outsiders. To accentuate the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the group may even adopt 
norms and behaviours which are explicitly oppositional to those of the outgroup with whom 
they are in conflict, and which, in turn, serve to entrench and escalate the tension between the 
parties (Forsyth, 1990; Turner & Killian, 1987).  
 
The effects of intergroup conflict in producing chronic group solidarity and defiance are 
common themes in early micro-sociological analyses of prison behavior (e.g., Clemmer, 
1958; Goffman, 1961; Sykes, 1958). These descriptions of prison life emphasise the division 
between prisoners and guards and the formation within the prison walls of two conflicting 
societies. Faced with the harshness of the prison environment, prisoners are forced to band 
together for physical and psychological protection. Group cohesion is reinforced by an 
inmate code which not only espouses values of in-group loyalty -- ‘never rat on a con’ -- but 
proscribes the conventional values of hard work and submission to authority which are held 
by society and enforced the prison guards. The more repressive the institutional regime, the 
greater the pressures on prisoners to maintain a unified resistance.  
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However, the counterproductive effects on excessive constraint on group behavior can be 
more acute. There are numerous documented cases of collective disturbances which have 
been precipitated by overpolicing (Reicher, 1987; Scarman, 1981; Veno & Veno, 1993). 
Veno and Veno’s (1993) description of recurring disorder at an annual motor cycle race 
provides the typical elements. In this case, because rioting had become an almost annual 
event, police and patrons arrived at the scene each year with established in-group allegiances 
and negative expectancies about each other’s behaviour. The police response to the problem 
over the years was to increase police numbers (from a low of 110 to a high of 400) and to 
introduce progressively more confrontational and draconian control strategies (the formation 
of a special riot squad complete with full riot gear, the construction of a police operations 
centre at the race site, the imposition of severe alcohol and movement restrictions, a heavy 
reliance on arrest and so forth). These strategies were not just ineffective but were 
provocative. Police and patrons quickly separated into two warring factions, and invariably, 
the riots began with assaults by the crowd on the police operations centre. Veno and Veno’s 
suggestion (which proved to be effective) was to ease crowd restrictions and reduce, not 
increase, the police profile at the race. 
 
Reicher (1987) stressed the purposefulness of cohesive groups. He argued that the behavior 
of cohesive groups is not random but is consistent with the values and aims of the collective. 
He points out, for example, that often the targets of rioting crowds are carefully selected and 
are restricted to people or objects associated with the perceived enemy of the group. He gives 
as an example the ‘St Paul’s riot’. The riot was triggered by a show of force by police aimed 
at clearing crowds which had gathered after the arrest of a local man. In the ensuing conflict, 
police were the only people injured in collective attacks by the rioters, and, while 21 police 
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vehicles were damaged, there were no reports of damage to private property. Reicher argued 
that riots have a ‘social form’ and that participants pursue objectives which are collectively 
regarded as legitimate.  
 
EXCESSIVE CONSTRAINT AND DISINHIBITION 
Under certain conditions, the group solidarity described in the preceding section can progress 
to deindividuation. One of the key determinants of deindividuation, in addition to group 
membership, is arousal (Forsyth, 1990). Thus, provocative methods of crowd control -- 
sometimes a single triggering incident -- can induce deindividuation by heightening the sense 
of righteous rage of crowd members. Colman’s (1991) account of a number of murders 
carried out by rioting crowds in apartheid-era South Africa draws upon the concept of 
deindividuation. In one incident, he describes how, after an unprovoked police attack on a 
meeting which left 11 people dead, a crowd singled out a suspected police-collaborator. The 
crowd sang and danced in celebration while the victim lay dying with a burning car tire 
around her neck.  
 
The depersonalisation of potential victims may also be an unintended consequence of crime 
prevention. ‘Over-hardened’ environments may help divest individuals of their human 
qualities and so render them psychologically more acceptable targets for victimization 
(Wortley, 1996). High walls, security guards, locks, bars and so forth not only create physical 
barriers between potential offenders and victims, they create psychological barriers as well. 
For example, the traditional approach to protecting prison officers from assaults by prisoners 
is to minimise the need for personal contact between the two groups through the installation 
of bars, bullet-proof glass, automatic doors, video cameras and so forth (Atlas & Dunham, 
1990). However, such strategies also serve to weaken the social bonds between prisoners and 
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guards, and to encourage a perception of each group by the other as objects. The alternative is 
to reduce the physical barriers which separate prisoners and guards and encourage greater 
interpersonal contact between the two groups. Prisons which encourage direct contact 
between prisoners and guards report lower levels of violence than prisons which rely on 
traditional methods of segregation and reactive security (Wener et al, 1987). 
 
EXCESSIVE CONSTRAINT AND AVERSIVE EMOTIONAL AROUSAL  
Attempts to constrain behavior can be stress-producing. In particular, over-control can 
generate frustration. Reducing crime opportunities often involves blocking goal directed 
behavior. Being thwarted need not necessarily produce frustration and aggression. However, 
if the methods of control are aversive or the legitimacy of the control is questioned, then the 
resulting aggressive response may be such as to overwhelm the attempts at control which 
produced it. 
 
Veno and Veno (1993) described the role of frustration in the motor cycle riots discussed 
earlier. They highlight, in particular, the police tactic of enforcing the ‘letter of the law’. On 
average, each patron was stopped three times by police before arriving at the event. On each 
occasion, the patron was searched and was often issued a citation for a trivial violation (e.g., 
having a dirty licence plate). Searching required the patron to unpack all belongings and to 
remove leathers and jackets. Searches were carried out by groups of up to five uniformed 
police officers armed with long batons. By the time the patrons arrived at the race, they had 
already been subjected to considerable frustration which detracted from their anticipated 
enjoyment and undoubtedly contributed to the conflict with police which ensued.  
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Frustration can also occur when an offender is thwarted in the process of committing a crime, 
and this may have the effect of escalating the offence. Indermaur (1996) interviewed 
perpetrators and victims of robbery with violence. He found the degree of violence against 
victims was related to the level of resistance that they offered during the offence. Victims 
who tried to defend themselves or to mount an attack only succeeded in enraging the offender 
and provoking further violence against themselves. Indermaur advised that the safest strategy 
for victims was to adopt non-confrontational techniques and allow the offender to proceed 
with the robbery. 
 
It is also possible that obtrusive opportunity-reduction strategies contribute to environmental 
stress and in this way increase levels of antisocial behavior. This may be a particular problem 
in institutional settings where the options for escaping environmental pressures are limited. 
One potential source of institutional stress is the conflict between the surveillance needs of 
staff and the privacy needs of inmates. Benton and Obenland (1975) compared the adjustment 
of prisoners in correctional institutions using CCTV with that of prisoners in institutions 
which did not. They found that the use of CCTV had a negative ‘psychological effect’ on 
inmates, increased their sense of institutional alienation, reduced their levels of interpersonal 
interaction, and resulted in them feeling less safe. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The inclusion of precipitating factors in considerations about the causes of crime presents a 
much more dynamic view of offender motivation, one which more accurately reflects the 
person-situation interaction as it is presented in the psychological literature. Mischel (1968), 
whose cogent rebuttal of the static, cross-situationally consistent model of personality is 
invariably cited as supporting evidence for situational crime prevention, was saying more 
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than that people consciously adjust their behavior to suit the circumstances. Mischel’s point 
was that people themselves change with the situations -- that who someone is depends in part 
upon where that someone is. It is this profound nature of the relationship between the person 
and the situation which an opportunity-reduction model by itself fails to capture. 
 
The idea that crime might be actively precipitated by situational factors has considerable 
significance for the crime displacement debate. If the inclination to offend, and not just the 
opportunity to do so, is situationally dependent, then the efficacy of situational prevention 
becomes more theoretically plausible. Whereas opportunity-reduction implies a reliance on 
reactive strategies designed to repel the motivated offender, intervention at the precipitation 
stage involves proactive attempts to inhibit criminal intentions before they are formulated. 
Where the latter can be achieved, the issue of individuals seeking out new crime 
opportunities does not arise.  
 
It should be noted that it is not claimed here that researchers and practitioners have totally 
ignored crime prevention at the precipitation stage. Clarke (1992), and later Clarke and 
Homel (1997) and Wortley (1996), proposed classification systems of opportunity-reduction 
which, though not explicitly acknowledging it, included strategies for controlling crime-
precipitating events. For example, the crime prevention category ‘deflecting offenders’, 
which is classified by Clarke and Homel as an opportunity-reduction strategy, seeks to pre-
empt trouble by ensuring that potential offenders do not enter criminogenic situations. 
Arguably, then, deflecting offenders is more accurately described as an example of 
precipitation-control. The argument for separating crime-precipitating situations from 
opportunity-related situations is based more on the need for conceptual clarity than on the 
assumption that there necessarily will be a resultant dramatic increase in available techniques 
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(Wortley, 1997). Suggestions of how some of the strategies originally concepualized within 
an opportunity-reduction framework might be reclassified in terms of the proposed categories 
of crime-precipitation are shown in Table 1. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The distinction between interventions aimed at controlling crime precipitators and those 
aimed at reducing crime opportunities broadly parallels the distinction which has been made 
previously between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ situational crime prevention (Wortley, 1996). The 
concept of soft situational crime prevention was originally proposed to describe strategies 
involving the manipulation of social and psychological situational elements in an effort to 
induce in the potential offenders a sense of guilt and shame for their contemplated crime. Soft 
prevention was so-called because the strategies were seen to be relatively unobtrusive and 
could be distinguished from the more usual methods of opportunity reduction -- and 
especially target hardening -- which relied largely on the manipulation of physical costs and 
benefits. While soft situational prevention was originally conceived of in terms of reducing 
social and psychological ‘opportunities’ to offend, many of the strategies suggested in 
Wortley (1996) fit more logically in the crime-precipitation stage (see Table 1). Similarly, 
additional strategies to inhibit the inclination to offend which have been suggested in the 
present paper and in Wortley (1997) often involve softening in some way those harsh and 
impersonal environmental elements which might generate criminal behaviour. 
 
The distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ prevention has been highlighted before in the crime 
prevention literature (although not necessarily in these terms). Typically, however, the 
argument has been framed as a choice between situational methods (hard) and social and 
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community approaches (soft) (Bottoms, 1990; Bottoms et al, 1995; Weiss, 1987). Usually, 
the distinction between the two approaches has been made in order to stress the supposed 
draconian nature of situational prevention. However, the present paper suggests that some 
interventions thought of as social prevention may in fact be situational. Bottoms et al (1995), 
for example, compared management regimes in two prisons, one which emphasised tight 
security and restrictions on prisoner movements, and one that emphasised high levels of 
prisoner privileges and autonomy. The first regime, which Bottoms et al labelled situational 
prevention, sought to maintain order by reducing opportunities to misbehave. The second 
regime, labelled social prevention, sought to maintain order by reducing the frustrations and 
deprivations of prison life. Clearly, however, both of these approaches are ‘situational’ 
according to the scope of the model proposed in this present paper. Opportunity and 
frustration are equally products of an immediate environment. Similarly, the efficacy of both 
opportunity-reduction and frustration-reduction depends upon the situational variability of 
behavior.  
 
There is no implication intended in this paper that one form of intervention is necessarily 
superior to the other. Whether ‘soft’ precipitation-control or ‘hard’ opportunity-reduction is 
appropriate will depend upon the circumstances. Undoubtedly there are predatory offenders 
who enter situations already determined to offend and ready to exploit any perceived security 
weakness. In these cases, the crime prevention emphasis will be on opportunity-reduction 
strategies. By the same token, some precipitating events may be so powerful as to override 
any meaningful cost-benefit analysis by the offender. Extremely frustrated individuals, for 
example, may lash out with little regard to the immediate consequences of their behavior. In 
this case, frustration-reduction strategies are likely to be more important than attempts to 
constrain the behavior. In many cases, both hard and soft approaches may be called for and 
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form complimentary elements within a total crime prevention package. Even in Bottoms et 
al’s liberal prison regime there were limits to prisoner autonomy and an ultimate reliance on 
opportunity-reducing strategies. The prisoners, after all, remained securely contained behind 
prison walls.  
 
That said, on occasions hard and soft strategies clearly involve contradictory logics. The two 
prison regimes described by Bottom et al demonstrate opposing solutions to the specific 
problem of maintaining internal order. One course of action -- maximizing prisoner 
autonomy -- necessarily precludes the other -- minimizing prisoner autonomy. More 
seriously, adopting one approach may actively work to the detriment of the other -- granting 
prisoners greater freedom may increase opportunities for misbehavior while restricting 
prisoner movements may increase frustrations. This paper has raised a number of other 
examples where there is a fundamental dilemma of whether it is better to ‘come down hard’ 
or ‘go in soft’ in order to prevent crime. Should vandalism targets be hardened or beautified? 
Is it better to control crowds by a high-profile or low-profile police presence? Should crime 
victims be advised to resist aggressors or cooperate with them? 
 
Such choices about appropriate responses to crime problems, however, rarely involve static 
decisions (Cohen et al, 1995; Vila, 1994). Rather, the adoption of a particular crime control 
strategy is typically preceded by a series of earlier (and increasingly ineffective) prevention 
attempts. The crime strategies employed by offenders and the counter strategies employed in 
the name of crime prevention are in a dynamic relationship. Offender behavior shifts in 
response to control strategies which in turn must change to meet the altered crime problem. 
‘Too hard’ control, then, is frequently the end point of a crime strategy/prevention strategy 
spiral. For example, the repressive police tactics in responding to the motor cycle riots 
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described by Veno and Veno (1993) evolved and hardened over several years. Viewed from 
an evolutionary perspective -- and as demonstrated by Veno and Veno -- the adoption of soft 
prevention strategies may present an opportunity to disengage from this process of escalation.  
 
All of this begs the question: when does a prevention strategy become ‘too hard’? While 
there is no simple answer to this question, a number of guidelines for utilising constraining 
tactics have been suggested in this paper. In particular, methods of control which are 
experienced as aversive, those which are perceived as illegitimate, and those which interfere 
with people’s sense of humanness run the risk of encouraging crime rather than preventing it. 
Such unintended outcomes, however, should not be cited as evidence that the principle of 
situational prevention is conceptually flawed. On the contrary, even counterproductive 
prevention demonstrates the power of situations to influence people. Nor should these 
examples be simply dismissed as anomalies. Rather, the task for those interested in 
situational prevention is to develop predictive models which adequately account for the 
various effects which situational interventions produce. It is hoped that the distinction 
between precipitation-control and opportunity-reduction outlined here contributes to this aim.  
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Figure 1 The two-stage situational prevention model. 
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Table 1 Overlaps between crime-precipitation categories and original opportunity-reduction 
classifications by Clarke and Homel (1997) and Wortley (1996).  
Precipitation 
Category 
Clarke & Homel  Wortley Examples 
Controlling 
environmental cues 
Facilitating 
compliance 
 
Reducing 
temptation 
 
Controlling 
facilitators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing victim-
worth 
 
Reducing imitation 
 
Litter bins 
 
 
Off-street parking 
 
Gun control 
 
 
Environmental 
beautification 
 
Discrediting models 
Reducing social 
pressures 
Deflecting offenders 
 
 
 
Reducing social 
approval 
Tavern location 
 
Dispersing school 
gangs 
Reducing 
disinhibition 
Controlling 
disinhibitors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clarifying 
responsibility 
Server intervention 
 
 
Limiting uniform 
use 
Reducing stress & 
frustration 
Facilitating 
compliance 
 
 
 
Crowd management 
 
 
Increasing victim-
worth 
 
Improved library 
check-out 
 
Limiting patron 
density 
 
Victim cooperation 
strategies 
 
 
